All walkthroughs / Health organisation
A hospital group. Departments such as Cardiology and Radiology each own some of its data, and a custodian in each department decides who may read it.
The walkthroughs follow one research programme in the order it unfolds, with the same people and the same data throughout.
Before any data arrives, an organisation decides which department owns which data, who may approve access to it, which role each person holds, and what people are allowed to ask for.
Data that does not identify anyone, such as a table of hospital admissions counted by ward and quarter. At first nobody can read the table, not even the person who brought it in. A researcher finds it and asks to read it, and the department that owns it decides. The researcher then uses it from a notebook and makes a new table from a query.
A data engineer brings in a table of hospital admissions and a small public list of diagnosis codes. The admissions table starts closed to everybody, including the person who brought it in. The list is registered with a claim that it is open to all, and the custodian of the owning department agrees with the claim.
3. Health organisationA researcher is stopped at the table of admissions that a data engineer brought in, and sees only the public lookup. The researcher asks for access with a purpose and a reason, the custodian of the owning department grants it for a limited time, and the table opens.
4. Health organisationA researcher signs a Python notebook in as themself: the notebook shows a code, the researcher types it in the console and approves, and the notebook receives a short-lived pass. The pass cannot decide a request, and the researcher ends it from the list of notebooks.
5. Health organisationThe researcher makes a new dataset from a query over the admissions and the diagnosis lookup. Munitas plans it, runs it, and keeps the new dataset as restricted as its inputs. A colleague without access is refused, a query that reaches too far is stopped, and when the custodian withdraws the access the new dataset closes too.
Data that does identify patients, such as consultation recordings and a table of clinic appointments about the same patients. Unlike the admissions table, it names people, so every identifying detail is locked under a key made for each patient. An approver decides who may open a few rows or files. A reviewer decides whether the names have been removed well enough to release the result. An auditor can see how everything was used without seeing a name.
A data engineer brings in data that identifies patients. The page first asks whether anybody will ever need to be erased from it. Three consultation recordings are then locked under a key made for each patient, and a table of appointments about the same patients is sealed with what identifies them locked too.
7. Health organisationThe data engineer who brought in a table of appointments is refused its locked names and reasons, asks to read five rows for three days, and the custodian of the owning department decides. A researcher has no way to ask. The platform reports which readable columns could single a person out, and the lease opens exactly five rows.
8. Health organisationThe data engineer asks to open three of the locked recordings in the page, for an hour. The custodian allows two, the platform chooses which, and the engineer plays one. When the custodian ends the permission, the files close again.
9. Health organisationThe data protection officer writes down how much identifying detail a de-identified result may still hold, once for each audience it is released to, as named sets of limits. Everyone in the organisation can read them, and nobody else can set one.
10. Health organisationThe built-in pipeline removes names, dates and addresses from the three locked recordings and is scored against their answer keys. The person who started the run cannot decide the result, and neither can the custodian of the owning department. The de-identification reviewer chooses the standard for the audience, decides with a written reason, and a release widens access by one step.
11. Health organisationThe privacy auditor and the data protection officer read the record of everything that happened to the locked data: who read, who was refused, what was done to each column, and which key was opened and why. No patient's name appears, and the same person code ties a patient's recording to the same patient's row.
A person asks for a role and an approver decides. When a department's usual approver is away, another approver covers for them.
A researcher asks to hold a role and cannot decide the request alone. The person who runs Munitas is refused when trying to grant it, and the custodian of a department grants it instead.
13. Health organisationThe custodian of Cardiology names a colleague from another department as cover. The cover confirms a claim about Cardiology's data on their own, then the custodian ends the cover. The platform refuses to remove the last permanent approver and keeps a record of every change.
A program that works on data is held to the same rules as a person: it asks for access and waits for an approver to decide. A network architect decides which external hosts a version of it may call. The organisation also gives each agent a risk level, two people approve a version that lets an agent do more, and a person checks what an agent produces.
An AI agent that ranks radiology documents is given a new version of its code and run. The run waits until the custodian of the Radiology department grants it permission to read a dataset, in the same way a person's request would wait, and a second run has to ask again.
15. Health organisationA data engineer uploads a new version of a radiology agent and lists the one external host it needs to call. The version is sealed but cannot be deployed. Neither the engineer nor the custodian who owns the agent can decide the list: the network architect does, with a written reason. An approved version can then be deployed, and a version whose host is refused cannot.
16. Health organisationThe AI risk owner writes a short list of risk levels that says how strictly each kind of AI agent is held. A change to the list, here how often an agent at the Moderate level has to be confirmed again, is saved as a new version with who made it, when and why, and the earlier version is kept. Everybody signed in can read the list, nobody else can change it, and the change reaches the agents held at that level.
17. Health organisationThe AI risk owner has written risk levels. A data engineer registers an agent for the Cardiology department and proposes a level, an approver of the department agrees to its first version, and the AI risk owner confirms the level and the version in one decision. A sponsor is named, the agent is listed in the registry, and a later version that adds a tool the platform does not know needs both people again before it can be deployed.
18. Health organisationThe AI risk owner writes a list of tools the organisation has approved in advance, each with the highest risk level it is approved for, the conditions it is approved under and a date to look at it again. A new version of an agent that adds only listed tools does not wait for the people who would otherwise decide it, or needs only the department that owns the agent. A tool approved only up to a lower level, a tool that is not on the list and a tool that pages a person are each decided by a named person, with a written reason.
19. Health organisationAn agent that drafts visit notes from consultation transcripts runs for real in a sandbox. The data engineer who started the run cannot review it, so a reviewer corrects one run and accepts another, and the platform records who decided, when and how soon after the run ended. The data protection officer reads the counts for the agent, makes an evidence pack for an auditor and checks that no record was changed.
An organisation can write its own pipelines, which are series of steps that Munitas runs on data. A new version first runs only on development data, and a step that reads recordings needs an approver's agreement.
A data engineer in Cardiology registers a pipeline of their own, asks for access to a note, and runs the pipeline. A reviewer makes the final decision, as for every other pipeline.
21. Health organisationA data engineer in Cardiology has written a pipeline version that is still in development, so it may run only on development data. The engineer asks for a sample of the locked recordings, a custodian approves fewer, and the platform draws them. The pipeline version then runs for real on the sample and is refused on the real recordings. The sample ends, and recordings with no real person in them are declared synthetic.
22. Health organisationA data engineer in Cardiology uploads a pipeline with a step of their own that reads recordings and writes files. The platform refuses to run it until an approver of the owning department, who did not upload it, approves it. The run then makes a new version that waits for a review.
Every request to read data, from a person or a program, is recorded with who asked, what for and why it was allowed or refused. The people who watch can read the record and change nothing.